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Capacity of Phare and structural funds







The capacity of structural funds absorption is a priority for the member states
of the European Union which accessed the EU in 2004 and 2007, but slowing
rates of the absorption capacity of these funds were noticed in comparison to the
absorption rates of pre-accession funds.
Within  the  context  of  “pre-accession  versus  post-accession”  analysis,  we
present the gradual flexibilization of the process of EU funds absorption, the
transfer of responsibilities for funds management towards the member states, as
well as the differences between the two financing instruments used by the Eu-
ropean Union function of different coordinates.
The accession of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe
testimonies for the efficient ways of conditioning the aid for modernization offered
to these countries, creating a reference framework whose coordination by pro-
active measures should continue during the post-accession period too.
*The article has enjoye d the support of the CNCSIS grant, IDEI 226/2007: „Capacity of Romanian
institutions from social inclusion area to absorb and manage the structural funds”.
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The success of the positive conditionality during the pre-accession period
should be preserved by focusing on endogenous aspects specific to the assumption
of responsibility for structural funds absorption by every new member state.
Keywords: absorption capacity, positive conditionality, structural funds, Eu-
ropean funds, new member states
Introduction
Within the context in which during the post-accession period the new member
states receive the most generous allocation of funds in order to close the gaps
separating them form the European average, predictions can be made by analyzing
the results recorded during the pre-accession period, as well as by observing the
early results of the countries which have accessed in 2004, in terms of performance
of structural funds absorption. The efficient and efficacious use of the structural
funds is an indicator to be evaluated at the end of the financing cycle. However,
the countries which have accessed in 2004 and 2007 had to go through several
compulsory stages during the pre-accession period, particularly concerning the
programming segment, which is considered to be an input indicator (Zaman, Gh.,
Georgescu, G., 2009, pp. 142) with severe implications on the absorption of the
structural and cohesion funds.
The political commitment during the pre-accession period competed with the
solidarity of the citizens from the member states and from the candidate countries,
aspects undergoing changes, sometimes even with negative oscillations within
the context of the financial crisis. The clear trend for a more rigorous management
of the public funds is increasingly obvious both at the national and at the European
level, its impact resulting from the strict enforcement of the procedures and by
redirecting the funds towards the regions which develop efficient mechanisms for
funds absorption.
However, the slowing rate of structural funds absorption in the new member
states from Central and Eastern Europe requires a comparative analysis of the two
periods, pre-accession and post-accession, in order to ascertain the differences
existing between the mechanisms of granting and managing the European aid.80
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Integration and the conditionality of the Central and Eastern European
countries
The fall of the communist regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe and the
staunch option of these states to adopt the market economy model represented
unprecedented elements in world history. Staring with 1990, most of the Central
and Eastern European countries, Romania included have seen the European Union
as a point of support, while the process of European integration was perceived as
an opportunity for their economic revival.
The start of the 90s in Europe was quite unusual. The idea of a new en-
largement, towards Eastern and Central Europe, was not rejected; on the contrary,
it was looked upon as a chance to accomplish “an integrated Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals”, as the French President De Gaulle put it years ago. The
idea of enlargement was present particularly at the level of the political statements
and discussions; although apparently the opinions of the European officials were
favourable, in principle, to the idea of a new enlargement, the positions of the
member states were not identical, rather contradictory often, particularly con-
cerning the actual conditions and the moment of accession. There was a consensus,
however, that the enlargement towards the east will be possible, but in a more
remote period of time, after the candidate countries fulfilled several properly
defined criteria which were formulated, though, only in 1993 at the Copenhagen
Council of Europe.
The systematic review of the set of accession criteria was subsequently ne-
cessary, which made the debates and negotiations slide from the sphere of quan-
titative monitoring to that of qualitative evaluation.
In the 90s, the European Union was the subject of important transformations
and it was at the final of the period of transition of the second and third en-
largements – Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1985-1986), countries whose
level of development was lower to the average community level and whose
integration within the structures of the union proved to be costly. The reunification
of Germany during the early 90s also required financial efforts not just from the
German state, but also from the European community. After such experiments, it
seemed only justified the reluctance of the member states to accept countries with
no experience of authentic market economy, with low levels of economic de-
velopment, in most cases with standards of living lower even than the level of
development of the newest member states.
During the early 90s, the attention of EU and member states authorities focused
on other aspects of the European integration. As the single market was accom-
plishing and in agreement with the ambitious ideas of the Rome Treaty and of the
Single European Act, the European Union redefined its priorities. These priorities
are to be found in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. EU actions focus on a deeper81
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integration, which was obvious all along the 9th decade. The European Union was
the adept of the idea of enlargement, however, by accepting members with a high
level of development and high economic potential, as proved by the on-going
negotiations at that time for the third wave of enlargement, towards the north,
which ended in 1995 with the accession of Swede, Finland and Austria.
The enlargements of 2004 and 2007, which included 12 new member states
including Central and East European states, reveal the fundamental ideals, values
and goals of the EU.
The monitoring reports of the European Commission released before the pre-
accession period tried to provide answers to three different categories of questions:
a. degree in which the applicant/candidate state will be ready for integration
within the European Union on January 1st, 2004 (the countries were evaluated not
by their capacity at that specific time to be ready for integration, but in terms of
their capacity to be ready in the beginning of 2004); b. problems which had to be
solved before accession; c. aspects that might freeze the accession if unsolved
despite the preliminary positive decision from 199. After the answers to these
topics were aggregated, a hierarchy of the country scores from the candidates to
accession was presented in the Luxembourg meeting of the Council of Europe
(highest score was 40). As it can be seen from the table below, Romania ranked on
the penultimate position in relation to the mentioned criteria.
Table 1: Country scores in relation to the Copenhagen criteria
Source: Council of Europe, 1997
As it can be seen, despite different predictions as to the perspectives of finali-
sing the accession, the reason for EU existence was consolidating by encouraging
peace, stability, democracy and prosperity throughout Europe by integrating the
states and peoples. The expansion transposes into life this vision by encouraging
the economic and political integration. For the Central and Eastern European
countries, the accession symbolizes a return within Europe and the chance to
firmly anchor their own democracies within the EU, Wim Kok (2003).
Hungary  33 
Poland  32 
Czechia  29 
Slovenia  25 
Estonia  24 
Slovakia  23 
Lithuania  19 
Latvia  18 
Romania  13 
Bulgaria  10 
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Table 2: Main data of the enlargement process concerning the Eastern European states
  1989 – Fall of the Berlin wall. Start of the financial aid of the European
Union for the Central and Eastern European countries, for the reform and
renewal of their economies
  1990 – Cyprus and Malta apply for EU membership
  1990-1996 – Conclusion of the association agreements (European Agre-
ements) with the Central and Eastern European countries
  1993 – The Copenhagen Council of Europe approves the enlargement of
EU to include the Central and Eastern European countries and defines the
criteria which these countries must meet before accession
  1993 – The European Commission publishes its opinions on Cyprus and
Malta
  1994 – The Essen Council of Europe approves the pre-accession strategy
  1994-1996 – Ten Central and Eastern European countries apply for EU
membership
  1997 – The European Commission publishes its opinions on the Central
and Eastern European countries and proposes a strategy of the enlargement
process in the “Agenda 2000”
  1998 – The negotiations for accession begin with Hungary, Poland,
Estonia, Slovenia, Czechia and Cyprus. Malta reactivates its application for
EU membership
  1999 – The Berlin Council of Europe approves the “Agenda 2000” and
a  financial  perspective  for  EU  enlargement. Turkey  is  accepted  in  the
enlargement process based on the Copenhagen criteria
  2000 – The negotiations for accession begin with Slovakia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta
  2002 – The Copenhagen Council of Europe marks the end of the acce-
ssion negotiations with Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hun-
gary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Czechia
  2004 – Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland,
Estonia, Slovenia and Czechia become members of the European Union
with full rights
  2006 – April 25, in Luxemburg, Romania and Bulgaria, together with
the EU member states have signed the Treaty of Accession to the European
Union, which entered into force on January 1
st, 2007
  2007 – January 1st, 2007, Romania and Bulgaria become members of
the European Union with full rights83
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During the pre-accession period, the efforts of the member states has been
directed towards establishing the conditions to apply single sectoral policies,
towards stressing on the interdependencies and towards meeting the convergence
criteria stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty, as essential processes for the accom-
plishment of the extremely ambitious goal of achieving the economic and mo-
netary union. The short-term costs associated to all these projects of increasing
the European cohesion were already estimated as being high, the consequence
being the increase in weight of the cost-benefit criterion within the evaluation of
the political decisions to be made.
The institutional consequences of EU enlargement are reflected in different
forms: the increasing influence of the “small” candidate countries within the
works of the Council where a total period of 9.5 years of presidency of the total
13 years is presumed, which means a very high proportion of presence at the level
of Council chairing. The number of European commissioners will increase by the
end of the successive waves of enlargement, which is presumed to have substantial
effects at the level of the global efficiency of this forum.
The enlargement towards the east has been and still is a strongly debated
subject within the European Union. No other enlargement wave enjoyed so much
attention. The conditions and premises of enlargement towards the east are com-
pletely different than those of any previous enlargement.
The general implications of globalization and the consequences of the 2004
and 2007 enlargements determined assumptions of position by the EU member
states representatives concerning the rigidity and stagnation observed in the main
European economies. The solutions to the known problems referred mainly to the
acceptance of a number of liberal solutions characterized by workforce market
competitiveness  and  capital  mobility. Within  this  context,  during  the  British
presidency of the second half of 2005, Tony Blair mentioned the areas that have
to be reformed: workforce markets, energy dependence, innovation, demographic
policy, the balance between life at work and life at home (Helle C. Dale, 2005).
The concept of positive conditionality has been regarded as the “golden carrot”
of the EU policies of vicinity, enlargement and foreign affairs. Approached as an
important and valuable method of the partnership between EU member states and
candidate states in developing the social, politic and economic process through an
efficient system of motivation, the positive conditioning is presently used in
various areas, from the development of cooperation to the policy of vicinity,
being an aspect of success on the contemporary agenda.
Generally, conditionality can be regarded as a theoretical subcomponent or a
method which explains the logic relations between two or more actors. Con-
ditionality provides instruments to connect the state or the international orga-
nization with the benefits wanted by another international actor by meeting several
conditions (Smith, 1987). Conditionality can be perceived as an institutional84
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norm or agreement. Killick (1998, pp.6) defined conditionality as a “set of mutual
agreements by which a state undertakes, or promises to do so, specific political
actions in support to which an international financial institution or another agency
will supply specified values of financial assistance”. A certain similitude with the
legal norms can be observed, especially by the negative conditionality by which
any  clauses  of  rejection  or  infringement  of  the  agreed  conditions  determine
penalties or sanctions.
The main argument in using the conditionality is a higher social, economical
and political influence, while avoiding the more dangerous or costly methods.
Conditionality is grounded on the confidence that the assistance will produce a
cumulative progress and a consistent growth: the forced reforms create political
backup and the political backup allows the reforms and modernization to continue
(Fiero, 2003:95). The models of conditionality may be divided into two different
sets: first, the models elaborated for the development of cooperation by less
developed countries; second, the models developed by EU and NATO to impose
a conditionality of structural pre-accession.
Conditionality as concept may be differentiated, categorised and measured in
relation to three main aspects:
1. The ex post conditionality has the usual form of the international legislation:
the conditions must be met after the ratification of an agreement or treaty or after
signing a contract. Ex ante conditionality means that the conditions must be met
in advance or immediately after a contract is signed (Santiso 2002, pp. 6);
2. The conditionality can be unilateral or multilateral. While during the cold
war the unilateral conditionality was predominant, after 1990 EU, OSCE and
NATO conditionality started to replace the former unilateral conditionality (Stokke
1995, pp.7).
3. The conditionality can be essentially positive or negative. The purpose of
the negative conditionality is to influence a situation which already exists (the
type of trade, the diplomatic relations etc.) which is threatened to be changed if
the  targeted  country  doesn’t  meets  specific  requirements. The  negative  con-
ditionality involves sanctions to be imposed, such as reduction, abatement or
canceling of the benefits if the specific country doesn’t complies with some
criteria (Fiero 2003, pp.100).  The  positive  conditionality  has  an  ex  ante  di-
mension; in this case, a side is not satisfied in the starting point, which motivates
another actor to change. The influence is grounded on the promises of the actors
to supply specific stimulants if the recipient state succeeds to meet certain con-
ditions. The positive conditionality may include the reduction of the trade barriers,
the establishment of a new net of cooperation, the supply of financial aid and the
establishment of free visa regime. The positive conditionality is known as the
“carrot method”, while the negative conditionality is regarded as the “stick me-
thod” (Fierro 2003, pp.100). The positive conditionality is asymmetrical by its85
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nature because a contractor is required to achieve a contract earlier. Also, it is
technically more complex than the negative conditionality, but can be imple-
mented gradually and without a wide consensus. It is dependent of the pre-
conditions because it can only succeed in a situation in which the expected benefits
of the recipient side are larger than the costs of the adjustments (Schimmelfenning,
Sedelmeier 2007, pp.89). The moral aspects of the positive conditionality allow
the accomplishment of the goals: the recipient state needs resources for reform
and the donor country needs the relocation of the economic resources and the
prevention of conflicts in its vicinity.
The accession history of the new EU member states from Central and Eastern
Europe proves successfully the efficient methods to condition the aid for mo-
dernization given to them, creating thus a framework of reference which should
be coordinated by proactive measures during the post-accession period too.
The PHARE program – vehicle of the European integration
The European Union and its member states have characterised conditionality
as being a functional cooperation or a method of integration from the pre-accession
period through which guiding and strict rules are required in order to ensure the
efficient convergence with the European structures and to support the transition
societies in their process of modernization. The motivation of conditionality was
also characterized as functional in the mutual interest of the specific states and of
the European Union.
The Phare program is one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by
the European Union in support of the applicant countries from Central and Eastern
Europe to be ready for integration in the European Union. Launched in 1989 to
support Poland and Hungary, the Phare program was expanded to the other states
in the region to support them during a period of massive restructuring and pro-
found political change. Until 2000, the west Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia) have been bene-
ficiaries of the Phare program, and as of 2001, the financial assistance of the
European Union to these countries materialized in CARDS program (Community
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability in Balkans). The objec-
tives of Phare program were to strengthen the administrations and public insti-
tutions so they will function efficiently in the European Union, to promote the
convergence with the European legislation (acquis communautaire), to shorten
the transition period and to promote the economic and social cohesion. In 1999,
these directions were redefined by the creation of two distinct programs SAPARD
and ISPA, offering the possibility to cover those areas which were not addressed
by the activities in PHARE portfolio.86
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Within the context of this analysis it is important to remember that 2003 was
the final programming year for the new member states which have accessed in
2004, while Phare programming continued for Romania and Bulgaria during
2004-2006 with a substantial increase of the financial allocations.
Since the establishment of the Phare program, the actual process of financing
displayed an oscillating evolution, the main results being ascertained by the
European  bodies  (the  European  Commission,  the  Court  of Auditing  and  the
Council of Europe) and put into practice in different periods. Thus, two British
authors (Bailey, D., De Propis, L, 2004, pp. 80-85) have identified three distinct
periods in the evolution of Phare program during which new mechanisms of
financing have been put into practice, which aimed to improve the process of
absorption of the funds allocated to the applicant countries.
During 1989 – 1997, Phare program was oriented towards providing technical
assistance at the governmental and ministerial level in the areas of public fi-
nancing, agriculture, environment and privatization and towards developing the
small  and  medium  enterprises. The  main  criticisms  referred  to  the  fact  that
programming was complex, expanded in time and not entirely efficient and each
project had a project management unit. There also were several specific problems:
1. existence of 5 levels of the programming documentation; 2. inadequate and
unclear procedures of monitoring and control; 3. overcrowding of the admi-
nistration and obstacles in purchases transparency; 4. the contracting rates were
below 10% in 1997 (the payments for the period 1990-1998 amounted to just
5.589 billion euro, while the concluded contracts amounted to 8.891 billion euro).
During 1998-2000, measures have been taken for a better knowledge of the
procedures, to ensure the continuity of the public service and to increase com-
petition in applying the Phare tender procedures. Thus, starting from the fact that
the project management units turned into entities separated from the government,
the National Funds have been established, and structures specialised in running
the programs were established within the ministries of finances (Central Finance
and Contracting Unit). Consolidated targets were established for large investments
(to avoid the proliferation of small projects) and the five levels of the programming
documentation have been replaced by the Partnership for accession and by a
single annual proposition for financing which allowed phasing the contracting
and payment activities. In consequence, the contracting rates improved in 1998
compared to 1997, in terms of shortening the time between filling in the do-
cumentation for financing and contracting (Commission, 2000a). The reforms of
1997 resulted in a higher proportion of projects evaluated as satisfactory, from
39% in 1999 to 56% in 2000 (Commission, 2000c).87
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Table 3: Contracting rates and expenditures before 1998
Source: Commission (2000a)
The assimilation of the Phare program within the framework of the gover-
nmental structures means that the process started, in terms of reform, to accom-
plish the objective of implementing the structural funds during the post-accession
period. There still was a problem, nevertheless, regarding the annual type of
programming specific to Phare program, which showed the incapacity of the
administrations from the candidate countries to gain experience in multiannual
programming required to access the structural funds.
From 2000 to the present moment, the pre-accession instruments diversified
by the establishment of ISPA and SAPARD. From this perspective, the Commi-
ssion engaged financially, for the period 2000-2006, funds amounting to 3 billion
euro, of which 1.5 billion euro for Phare, 1 billion for ISPA and 500 million for
SAPARD (Commission, 2000b). By “freeing” the Phare program of the areas
managed by ISPA and SAPARD, the vision of this program structured in three
distinct directions of financing: one third to co-finance the institutional capacity;
one third to adopt the community acquis by the candidate countries; one third to
achieve the economic and social cohesion by developing the mechanisms and
institutions required to implement the structural funds after accession to the
European Union. This last direction, objectified by the decentralisation of Phare
  % of the 
engagements 
contracted in 
1997 at the end 
of 1998 
% of the 
engagements 
contracted in 




1990 – 1998 
(mil. E) 
Total contracts 




Albania  -  -  493  348  316 
Bosnia  -  -  282  207  152 
Bulgaria  91  41  747  518  479 
Czechia  22  39  390  246  196 
Estonia  60  59  163  117  95 
Macedonia  -  -  167  128  94 
Hungary   10  23  864  587  567 
Latvia  53  50  207  150  115 
Lithuania  44  19  272  197  146 
Poland  28  49  1732  1386  1251 
Romania  55  38  972  676  598 
Slovakia  36  46  253  149  133 
Slovenia  34  38  131  96  78 
Former 
Czechoslovakia 
-  -  233  229  229 
Multi-state  -  -  881  701  545 
Horizontal 
programs 
-  -  1105  964  594 
Total  -  -  8891  6697  5589 
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management and by the introduction of the multiannual budgeting, had a built in
contradiction by the existence of the specific segment of annual programming of
the Phare program. By the absence of a concrete derogation from the rule of
annual planning, vulnerability is noticed in providing the continuity of funds
absorption during the post-accession period, which shows that the possible “sa-
turation point” in the absorption of funds might also occur in the European policies
of convergence (Cace C., Cace S., Iova C., Nicolãescu V., 2009). Regarding the
preparation of the candidate countries to manage efficiently the structural funds,
Bailey,D. and De Propis, L, (2004, pp. 85), recommend several measures:
– Continue decentralization in agreement with the reforms of the structural
funds;
– Emphasise on monitoring and evaluation;
– Ensure a better coordination with other pre-accession funds;
– Achieve a better organization within the European Commission;
– Prepare the candidate countries to access the structural funds by adopting
multiannual planning;
– Align Phare dispositions on transboundary cooperation in agreement
with Interreg program.
Despite the reforms undertaken within the Phare program since its establi-
shment and until the present time, its transient character can still be perceived,
due both to the political circumstances which existed all along the European
enlargement process, and to the political changes within the European Union
itself.
Structural funds – continuity of absorption in the absence of
conditionality
The integration of the Central and Eastern European countries within the
European Union certainly produced great expectations in terms of the positive
impact which the absorption of the structural funds had on the new member
states, but the distinct mechanisms adopted by each individual country, in ob-
servance of the European regulations, seem to produce different results. The
essential difference observed at the moment of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements
refers to the replacement of the pre-accession system of conditionality by the
adaptation to the governing system proper to the European Union.
From this new perspective, the nature of the European policy of convergence
still asks questions such as “who decides what” (Marks, 1996, pp. 389) or “to
what effect” (Bache, 1998, pp. 14).
The structural funds represent for some authors the “directionary limit of a
multilevel governing system” within which the power is shared between supra-
national, national and subnational actors (Marks, 1993), while other analysts89
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consider that the central governments remain firm of their positions of leaders,
playing the role of “guardians” between the pressures of the European Union and
the changes of the domestic and institutional policies (Allen, 2005).
If we consider the last two decades which brought about massive changes
within the Central and Eastern European countries, we can notice that in parallel
with the adjustments of Phare financing (by the creation of ISPA and SAPARD),
reforms have been implemented within four stages of structural financing (1989-
1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2006, 2007-2013). The examination of the four stages
revealed that the role of the national governments from the member states in
making key decisions was exaggerated by the literature (in relation with the role
of the European Commission). This statement is backed by some authors (Bachtler
J., Mendez C., 2007, pp. 556) by acknowledging that the architect of the reform
proposals in terms of budget structure and format of the rules of the cohesion
policy is the European Commission, even if the ultimate judge of the financial
and legal basis for the cohesion policy is the Council of Europe. To this direction,
the principles of concentration and programming have been put into practice
during the recent decades by methodologies elaborated by the Commission (Bach-
tler J., Mendez C., 2007, pp. 556):
a. concentration during the period 1988-2013, the Commission was able to
maintain concentrated two thirds of the structural and cohesion funds for the least
developed countries and regions. Thus, using a strict criterion applied at the GDP
per capita, concentration was limited spatially by covering Goal 1, financing 22%
to 28% of EU population, despite to two enlargements and despite the pressures
of the member states to provide a higher coverage.
b. programming – the European Commission influenced significantly each
stage of the reform cycle which started in 1988, adopting a hard influence by
enforcing the rules strictly, and by modelling a soft influence expressed by rule
interpretation using various mechanisms (guiding principles, working documents,
aide-memoires, etc.). The analysis of the programming experience reveals that
irrespective of the changes of regulations, the Commission was able to negotiate
the changes function of the program strategies, some times involving even major
adjustments in the choice of policies, in setting the strategic priorities and in
supplying working mechanisms towards the member states.
The evaluations of the impact which the enlargement had on the EU are,
generally, limited, given the much too large economic dimension of it. Such an
estimation says that the 15 old EU members will probably gain 10 billion euro, in
the long run, which means a 0.2% increase of the GDP in these countries, which
might create about 300,000 jobs (in the hypothesis of a constant ratio volume of
work – volume of production) (Grabbe, H. 2001).
Certainly, the effect of the positive conditionality is shown by comparing the
two periods, but it is difficult to measure the actual contribution of the funds90
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absorbed by the new member states to the global growth. However, a comparative
aspect shown in the table above indicates that the maximal and minimal limits of
economic growth of the two periods have been percentually higher for the period
2004-2006, which supports the idea of “group” growth of the Central and Eastern
European countries.
The efficiency of EU funds absorption may be studied in various ways: pro-
portion of applications related to engagements; proportion of signed contracts
related to engagements and rate of the certified expenditure related to enga-
gements.
By identifying the potential “gain” of the older EU 15 member states and of
the new member states, studies were conducted which try to reveal the efficient
mechanisms for funds absorption which the different member states used. Thus,
during 2004-2006, Ireland is considered to have scored the highest success within
the EU 15 nucleus, while Estonia and Slovenia stood out within the new member
states (Markoviè Hribernik T., Kirbiš M., Vek U, 2008, pp. 1234). Ireland has a
decentralised  system  with  some  management  and  payment  authorities  at  the
regional level, while Estonia and Slovenia have experimented more centralized
systems at the national level.
As predictive measure in evaluating the performance of structural funds ab-
sorption, at the beginning of 2003, the European Commission published reports
in which the previously identified indicators were tested on the ten candidate
states  to  the  2004  accession.  Eight  of  the  ten  studied  countries  became  EU
members in 2004, while the balance of two countries (Bulgaria and Romania), in
2007.
These country studies have been elaborated in order to identify the needs for
additional institutional construction and to improve the capacity of these countries
to  absorb  EU  funds  at  the  moment  of  accession.  The  results  have  shown  a
surprisingly poor level of the administrative capacity in eight new member states
from 2004. According to these studies, it was too early both for the candidate
countries which were included in the EU in 2004, and for Bulgaria and Romania.
Most EU member states experienced difficulties in the absorption of European
funds during the early years after accession, particularly due to the lack of a long-
term vision of the authorities, to the insufficient resources for project cofinancing,
to the low administrative capacity at the central and local level, to the lack of
interinstitutional coordination, to the failure of the public-private partnership, to
the limited abilities of the human resources, etc. (Zaman, Gh., Georgescu, G.,
200, pp. 144). Obviously, the mentioned dysfunctions were noticed in Romania
too, but here the administrative system for structural funds absorption can still be
activated.91
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Pre-accession positive conditionality versus rules observation during the
post-accession period
The choice of the model of conditionality among other options existing in the
pre-accession period is motivated by the long-term goal of having prosperity,
stability and security beyond its frontiers.
A more relaxed approach of the relations developed during the pre-accession
period is usually preferred because it is perceived as the best option for democratic
and friendly relations. By imposing a step-by-step socialization of the targeted
country, the socio-economic values and customs change in much more favourable
combinations (Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel 2006, Sedelmeier 2006). When
the model of conditionality is selected and evaluated, “efficiency” becomes the
most important variable. However, in any individual case efficiency depends only
on the expectations of the acting part: if the goal is reached using the planned
resources, conditionality proves to be a successful process.
Sustainability and continuity are important aspects in certain conditional re-
lations when the obvious economic and social progress can not be documented or
acquired (for instance in developing cooperation) (Checkel 2000). Success is a
problem related to the socio-economic and on the cultural context, which is
influenced by the “dependency print” of the process of modernization. For the
acting part the success of the conditional relations depends on the following
variables: degree of dependence of the targeted countries on the state that imposes
the conditions; supportive or neutralizing influence of other countries; measure in
which the targeted countries are willing to observe the conditions. Additionally,
the positive conditionality may include subcomponents such as legitimacy based
on mutual benefit; interest and voluntarianism; sovereignty; asymmetrical con-
tractual relations; economic and functional motivations; establishment of de-
pendent institutions in order to protect the process (Sedelmeier 2006, pp. 18,
Stokke, pp. 2).
New models of conditionality development during the period of 1990-2004
(2007) were built on conditionality when the aid was linked to the human rights,
democracy and the principle of law enforcement. The positive conditionality
became the corner stone of the relations with the less developed countries –
former colonies and with the candidate countries which want to cooperate with or
integrate within the EU. The former EU commissioner Christhoper Patten (1999)
declared: “In all our programs, there is a clear conditionality to our assistance.
The statistics tell us that the assistance to the states that don’t observe the agreed
conditions decreases, while it generally consolidates for the states that show a
positive trend in meeting the conditions”.92
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Although the success resulting from the enforcement of the measures specific
to the positive conditionality for accession to the European Union is constantly
highlighted, and while some authors pointed that the previous experience with
implementing the PHARE programs is once more ignored (Arpinte, D., Baboi, A.,
2009, pp.46), there are very little consistent debates on continuing the trend to
absorb pre-accession funds that might support the new EU member states currently
experiencing recession.
The opportunity of the new member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007
to  absorb  the  structural  funds  made  available  to  them  in  order  to  cover  the
economic and social disparities is also reflected by the rather simple mechanism
of accessing these funds. Table 4 shows the main differences between the pre-
accession and the post-accession funds.
Within the context of the ‘pre-accession versus post-accession” analysis one
may observe noticeable differences between the two financing instruments of the
European Union function of the different coordinates: Management structures;
Process monitoring; Programming; Organising the project proposal and project
approval. The general observation denotes the gradual flexibilization of the pro-
cess of European funds absorption as well as the transfer of the responsibilities for
funds administration towards the member states.
The identification of trends to slowing EU funds absorption, by relating the
rates from the pre-accession period to the rates from the post-accession period,
raises the problem of “annulling” the beneficial conditionality from the pre-
accession period of the new member states. Thus, the integration targets stimulated
the development of the administrative capacity under the “supervision” of the
European organisms, aspect which should be maintained and consolidated by
coherent policies during the current period of crisis.
The human resources generating the absorption of structural fund are in the
autonomous and responsible area of the member states administrations, which is
why the fundamental priority in achieving high absorption rates should focus at
the level of integration and coordination of their efforts. Averting the “saturation
point” described by the literature (World Bank 2004) refers to the macroeconomic,
institutional and socio-cultural constraints, but within the current post-accession
context it would be necessary to focus on the development of the available human
capital.
It is thus clear that the idea of “delaying to reach the saturation point” refers to
the determination of a country to use efficiently the aid irrespective of its level by
combining its political will, policies and institutions.93
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Table 4: Differences between the pre-accession funds and the structural funds
Pre-accession funds  Structural funds  
   the purpose of fund allocation is to support 
the state to meet the membership criteria 
   the tenders are done based on the Practical 
guidebook of the European Commission – 
PRAG;  the  documentation  is  done  in 
English 
   The European Commission exerts its (ex-
ante,  interim,  ex-post)  control  during  the 
implementation process 
   the purpose of structural instruments is to 
eliminate  the  economic  and  social 
disparities between EU regions 
   the tenders are done based on the national 
legislation;  the  documentation  is  done  in 
the language of the member state 
   the control functions are mandated to the 
member state: the principle of subsidiarity 
applies  
Management structures 
Functions of the Implementation Agencies: 
   organising tenders 
   contracting 
   monitoring implementation 
   financial making payments 
Functions of the Management authorities: 
   programming 
   monitoring implementation 
   financial management and control  
Functions of the intermediary organism: 
   initial selection of the project proposals 
   control during implementation 
   keep in contact with the beneficiaries and 
making payments 
Process monitoring 
The sectoral subcommittees ISPA and PHARE: 
   EC delegation, National coordinator of the 
assistance,  National  official  of 
authorization,  Implementation  agencies, 
economic and social partners 
   Project monitoring 
   Making decisions to reallocate funds, adopt 
changes in project files 
Monitoring committees working under the Sectoral 
operational programs: 
   Management  authority  of  the  operational 
programs, Intermediary organisms, Central 
unit  of  coordination,  Certification 
authority, economic and social partners 
   Program monitoring 
   Adopt the selection criteria for the projects 
   Adopt  the  annual  plan  for  program 
implementation 
   Making decisions to reallocate funds from 
one priority to another 
Programming 
Preparing the files, financing agreements with the 
EC  for  the  individual  projects  or  for  groups  of 
projects  (in  the  case  of  PHARE),  the 
implementation period n+2 (in the case of PHARE 
with  a  contracting  period  n+2  and  an 
implementation period n+3) 
Preparing and agreeing with the EC the Operational 
programs referring to the investments in a specific 
sector for a period of 7 years; allocation of the funds 
by each year complies to the principle of n+2 which 
besides contracting includes the implementation and 
the  payment  (during  the  period  2007-2013  the 
principle n+3 will apply) 
Organise the project proposals and project approval 
   Preparing  a  project  file  which  includes 
several  components  – twinning,  technical 
assistance,  investments,  grants.  Approval 
by  the  authorization  coordinator/official; 
by  the  National  coordinator;  by  the 
European Commission 
   After  the  contract  is  signed,  the 
implementation agency runs the tendering 
process; the call for proposals for grants; 
contractor selection; contract finalization 
   After the program is approved, the call for 
proposals is published; the project proposal 
is prepared by the beneficiary which sends 
it  to  the  intermediary  organism;  the 
Management  authority  asks  the  Selection 
committee to evaluate the applications and 
to  forward  them  to  it  for  approval.  The 
Management  authority  has  the  final 
decision for project approval. 
   The tendering procedure runs in agreement 
with the national legislation of the member 
state 94
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Conclusions
The shift from the status of candidate country to the status of full rights
member state of the European Union was a process coordinated and conditioned
positively by setting certain limits that are tangible, measurable and agreed jointly
by the “older” member states to the new member states from Central and Eastern
Europe. The transfer of responsibility towards the new member state, including
the absorption of the European funds is a multiple task for an infrastructure
harmonized with the European criteria, but lacking the experience to match with
the new parameters of competitiveness which don’t have the specific traits of
conditionality.
From this perspective, the assumption of the competitive role of the new
member state within the process of re-modernization of the new EU member
states implies internal human resources – capable, apt, available, renewable,
solidary and attached to a joint project dedicated to the implementation of a
pragmatic program – the first sure steps towards the primordial goals generating
progress.
From this stand point, the momentum and effervescence displayed during the
pre-accession period, boosted by the conditions of the integrating process should
become endogenous aspects specific to the assumption by every new member
state of responsibility for the absorption of the structural funds.
In absence of this endogenous element of internal growth, fundamented by
political will, there is a possibility to call on exogenous instruments to redirect the
process of positive integration of the member states and regions displaying sig-
nificant lags.
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